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Jacqueline Hodgson and Laurène Soubise
Understanding the
Sentencing Process in France
AB STR ACT
French sentencing is characterized by broad judicial discretion and an ethos
of individualized justice focused on rehabilitation. The aims are to prevent
recidivism, and so protect the interests of society, while reintegrating the
offender. By contrast, the political Right, characterized by the recent Sarkozy
regime, favors deterrence through harsher penalties, minimum prison
sentences, increased incarceration, and preventive detention of offenders
considered dangerous. The sentencing process can be understood only
within the broader context of inquisitorially rooted criminal procedure. The
central part played by the prosecutor (including in case disposition through
alternative sanctions) and her role in recommending sentences that the court
almost invariably endorses, together with the unitary nature of the judicial
profession, means that there is remarkable consistency in penalties imposed.
The contrainte pénale, based on a reconsideration of the range of available
penalties put forward by the Consensus Commission and legislated in 2014,
is unlikely to have great impact without investment in the probation service
and a change in the judicial culture that still favors simple sentencing options,
including imprisonment, compared with alternatives now in place.
As in many other jurisdictions, sentencing law and policy over the last
two decades in France have been preoccupied with such issues as ad-
dressing the increasingly overcrowded prison population, incorporating
the victim’s perspective in appropriate ways, preventing and punishing
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recidivism more severely, deﬁning and managing dangerous offenders,
and balancing the effectiveness of alternatives to imprisonment with
a political rhetoric of being tough on crime. Sentencing is an emotive
and political issue—prison overcrowding and recidivism both featured
in the French presidential campaign in 2012—and even where there is
some consensus as to the nature of the problem, there is little agreement
among politicians on how best to tackle it. Sentencing policies have
followed the political fortunes of the Left and the Right. Recent legisla-
tion, the law of 15 August 2014 (Loi no. 2014-896 of 15 August 2014,
Relative à l’individualisation des peines et renforçant l’efﬁcacité des sanc-
tions pénales), is no exception. It began life almost 2 years earlier as
an initiative by the incoming socialist President François Hollande to
reform the mandatory minimum sentences introduced in 2007 and the
rétention de sûreté, a measure that allows the continued detention after
completion of the sentence of those considered to be dangerous and
at high risk of reoffending because of a serious personality disorder. The
peines planchers, as these mandatory minimum sentences came to be called,
were targeted at recidivists but were extended in 2011 to ﬁrst-time of-
fenders in the case of some aggravated offenses. Both measures were
strongly associated with the politics of former right-wing President
Nicolas Sarkozy and were criticized as ineffective in preventing reof-
fending, while at the same time contributing to the increasing prison
population. While Sarkozy was in power, ﬁrst as minister of the interior
then as president, the prison population increased from around 48,000
in 2002 to 64,000 in 2012. The rate of imprisonment rose from 79.2
per 100,000 inhabitants to 99.2 in the same period.
In order to inform this most recent sentencing reform, the minister of
justice, Christiane Taubira, established a Consensus Commission to ﬁnd
ways of reducing reoffending and to examine the issue of “dangerous-
ness” in the offending population. The commission, which used an un-
usual methodology for a law reform inquiry,1 included a panel of 22 ex-
perts who selected a “jury” of 20 (presided over by Françoise Tulkens,
a former judge in the European Court of Human Rights) made up in
1 This method is more common in the medical ﬁeld. The idea is to identify the essential
issues and the points of disagreement. By bringing a range of perspectives, informed by
research from France and elsewhere and having a structured debate, the aim is to build a
consensus base on which to build. See the account of the methodology at http://conference
-consensus.justice.gouv.fr/note-dinformation-2/methode/.
222 Jacqueline Hodgson and Laurène Soubise
equal part of expert practitioners and nonspecialists who, in turn, heard
from some 30 experts in a series of public hearings. This approach was
advanced as scientiﬁcally rigorous, independent and with no link to gov-
ernment, and transparent, as hearings were held in public. It considered
research evidence from France and elsewhere in order to have a more
scientiﬁc basis to inform its recommendations. For example, in an at-
tempt to cut across the usual political debates and media portrayals,
the commission looked at the nature of recidivism, competing deﬁni-
tions, and frequencies of reoffending across offense types in order to de-
velop a range of effective penal responses.2
The commission produced a bold set of recommendations, which the
minister of justice was committed to taking forward, but which the inte-
rior minister, Manuel Valls, opposed. This is perhaps predictable given
the different perspectives and values typically advanced by these two dif-
ferent ofﬁces: the interior minister representing the police and law and
order and the justice minister representing the judiciary and the balance
of constitutional protections (see, e.g., the account of the reforms in
Hodgson [2005, chap. 2]). While both ministers agreed that recidivism
was a key problem to be addressed, they differed sharply in the choice
of solution. The interior minister favored incarceration, building more
prison places, and taking a tough stance on sentencing; the justice min-
ister, following the commission’s evidence and recommendations, fa-
vored greater use of alternative sanctions, sending fewer people to prison
in order to decrease levels of reoffending, and continuing to reduce the
prison population. This represented a complete clash of values and of
policy, typical of the functional differences between these two ministers
and their contrasting perspectives. However, in an unprecedented move
that demonstrates just how high the political stakes had become, with-
out informing the justice minister, Valls wrote to President Hollande,
voicing his strong opposition to the proposals and urging him to arbitrate
on the matter. The letter was published in Le Monde in July 2013, amid
a storm of controversy surrounding a decision by a procureur (public
prosecutor) to release from prison three offenders sentenced to short
sentences because the prison was full ( Johannès 2013).
The legislation made it onto the statute book a year later, and the ﬁnal
text of the law retained important reforms such as the creation of a new
probation sentence, the contrainte pénale, for middle-ranking offenses
2 The commission cited Huré (2012) as the only study on media portrayal of recidivism.
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(délits); the abolition of the peines planchers; and the removal of the auto-
matic revocation of suspended sentences on the commission of a further
offense. However, the rétention de sûreté, associated so strongly with the
Sarkozy regime, was retained and automatic early release on parole was
rejected.
This essay addresses some of the key themes in sentencing in France
and examines recent trends in policy. The French approach is to adapt
the penalty to the offender, striving for a justice that is individualized
without being arbitrary. Key to this is the relatively unfettered discretion
of the judiciary in determining sentence and the notion of sentencing as
a process rather than a single event that takes place at the conclusion of
the trial. The judge responsible for the execution of the sentence (the
juge d’application des peines or JAP) will review the penalty, taking account
of the offender’s employment and family situation and efforts she has
made to make good the harm caused. The sentence served by the of-
fender may be quite different from that handed down at trial: electronic
tagging may be substituted for a portion of custody once the sentence
has begun; noncustodial alternatives may be permitted if the offender has
made good progress toward her own rehabilitation; or prisoners may
be permitted to continue or take up employment through day release
schemes.
The sentencing discretion of the judge has been diluted, through
measures such as the suivi socio-judiciaire, controversially mixing treat-
ment and punishment, and the introduction of a measure permitting
the detention of dangerous offenders beyond the term of their sen-
tence—the rétention de sûreté. Both of these were products of the Sarkozy
regime, along with a system of minimum sentences for some offenses,
curtailing the traditional and constitutionally guaranteed discretion of
the sentencing judge. Pulling in the opposite direction has been the need
to address prison overcrowding. Right-wing administrations have fa-
vored harsher sentences and building more prisons, but the government
of Hollande has focused on rehabilitation and prevention of recidivism
through socially adapted (rather than simply harsher) penalties as a
means to reduce the prison population.
Here is how this essay is organized. We begin in Section I with an ac-
count of the general principles of sentencing in France and their context
within the inquisitorially rooted system of French criminal justice. The
centrality of the public prosecutor (the procureur) during each phase of
the criminal process is underlined, including her role in proposing a
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sentence to the court and in administering a variety of alternative pen-
alties. Also signiﬁcant are the relatively diminished role of the defense
lawyer and the professional unity of the judicial body (the magistrature),
which includes the prosecutor, the investigating judge ( juge d’instruction),
the trial judge, and the JAP. Sentencing patterns over recent decades are
examined, noting that, despite the introduction of a range of alternative
sanctions, including direct alternatives to custody, imprisonment con-
tinues to be the sentence of choice. Sentencing appears to be consistent
across the country. This may be explained by the unity of judicial culture
and the judicial hierarchy for both prosecutors and trial judges, which
helps to ensure the application of national and local policies—in partic-
ular that the prosecutor’s sentencing request in most instances is fol-
lowed by the court.
Section II discusses the process and laws of sentencing. The offender’s
relationship with the state is also part of the overall sentencing story.
The idea of individualized justice is ingrained in the trial structure (where
the antecedents and biography of the accused are set out before the evi-
dence has even been heard), reﬂecting the relationship with the state in
which the trial and sentence are part of the individual’s rehabilitation
as a citizen.
The law of 15 August 2014 was signiﬁcant in placing punishment and
rehabilitation on the same footing rather than in opposition. Rehabilita-
tion is seen by the current government as a key part of the task of reduc-
ing reoffending, and the legislation introduced a further noncustodial
sentencing option aimed at rehabilitation, the contrainte pénale, a form
of probation order. Research suggests, however, that judges prefer sim-
ple prison sentences to the myriad of alternatives available because it
is often unclear what is available for different levels of offense. The
contrainte pénale appears to be even more complex, making it unlikely
to appeal to a busy judiciary. Furthermore, there are existing measures
that achieve the same objectives of imposing obligations on the offender,
backed by the threat of a ﬁxed prison term, but are simpler to apply.
The August 15 reform also repealed minimum sentences, following the
ConsensusCommission’sﬁndings that these tended to increase the prison
population with no corresponding reduction in reoffending.
The ﬁnal sections provide practical examples of the work of the JAP in
adapting sentences to the needs of the individual. These illustrate the
close working relationship between the two magistrats, the public pros-
ecutor and the JAP, and the focus on personal rehabilitation. While ac-
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cused and convicted persons in adversarial procedures are often almost
silent, as it is their lawyers who advance the defense case, in the French
process, the judge addresses the accused (or here, the offender) directly.
Yet, in admonishing the accused in court or delivering a moralizing lec-
ture to the convicted offender, the magistrat is afﬁrming the potential of
rehabilitation and the value of the individual as a citizen.
The future of sentencing policy and practice in France will depend on
how the traditionally conﬂicting perspectives of the ministries of justice
and of the interior are resolved and on the politics of the government in
power. It will also depend on resources: new probation measures will re-
quire increases in probation personnel, which have been promised. The
prosecutor as sentencer is also an important trend that will continue to
deﬁne the sentencing landscape: around half of all cases prosecuted are
disposed of by the prosecutor through some form of alternative sanc-
tion. Many cases are dealt with through abbreviated procedures in which
the prosecution case and sentence are effectively rubber-stamped by the
court.
I. Sentencing and Sanctions
Overall, crime rates have fallen regularly in France since 1996. How-
ever, this hides important disparities between different types of offenses.
Offenses against property have been falling from a peak in 2001, but the
number of offenses against the person more than doubled between 1996
and 2011 (table 1).
Before examining patterns in sentencing and policy trends, we ﬁrst
outline the roles of key legal actors and the path followed by a typical
case.
A. The French Criminal Justice System
Founded on the inquisitorial principle, the French system of criminal
procedure is now best described as mixed. At the investigation stage, the
police or the gendarmerie carry out the investigation under the supervi-
sion of a judicial ofﬁcer. In 98 percent of cases, this will be the public
prosecutor ( procureur); less than 2 percent of cases, the most serious
and complex, are handled by the investigating judge ( juge d’instruction;
Ministère de la Justice 2014, p. 14). The evidence collected during the
investigation is compiled in the case ﬁle, which will then constitute
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the basis of the trial if the case is prosecuted. Offenses are divided into
three categories, from the more minor contraventions, through middle-
ranking délits, to the most serious crimes. Many contraventions, such as
trafﬁc offenses, are dealt with in a quasi-administrative way, but the re-
mainder are tried by a single judge in a tribunal de police. Délits are tried
in a tribunal correctionnel, which is traditionally formed of three profes-
sional judges, although cases can also be tried by a single judge. Lay
TABLE 1
Recorded Crime: 1996–2011
Offenses against
Property
Offenses against
the Person
Frauds and Economic
and Financial Offenses
1996 2,765,191 228,030 310,910
1997 2,685,053 244,880 295,511
1998 2,753,458 257,233 287,415
1999 2,716,865 282,963 295,734
2000 2,820,509 316,404 352,164
2001 3,063,922 362,175 366,208
2002 3,059,062 381,053 355,342
2003 2,881,838 389,172 349,473
2004 2,708,934 391,857 329,955
2005 2,633,571 411,350 318,680
2006 2,534,097 434,183 334,064
2007 2,363,519 433,284 345,416
2008 2,243,498 443,671 381,032
2009 2,227,649 455,911 370,728
2010 2,184,460 467,348 354,656
2011 2,146,479 468,012 350,040
SOURCE.—ObservatoireNationale de laDélinquance et desRéponses Pénales (ONDRP),
Bulletin Annuel 2011 (2012), p. 17 (http://www.inhesj.fr/fr/ondrp/les-publications/bulletins
-annuels/15).
NOTE.—The ONDRP created three indicators relating to crime recorded by the police
and the gendarmerie. Offenses against property encompass various offenses of theft and
criminal damage. Offenses against the person encompass acts or threats of violence and
sexual offenses. Frauds and economic and ﬁnancial offenses encompass frauds and various
other offenses such as counterfeiting, money laundering, etc. Some offenses appear in sev-
eral indicators (e.g., robberies appear in both offenses against property and offenses against
the person) and others appear in none (e.g., drug-related offenses). Aggregated data for
police and gendarmerie are available only until 2011 as the gendarmerie changed its record-
ing software in 2012 and the ONDRP considers that data generated by the new software
cannot be compared with data for previous years and cannot be aggregated with police
data.
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jurors are used only for crimes, which are tried by a cour d’assises, where
three professional judges sit alongside six jurors (nine on appeal). Jurors
and judges decide together on guilt and sentence.
French public prosecutors have great inﬂuence over the punishment
handed down by the courts. Not only do they decide whether to prose-
cute or not and on what charge, but they also recommend a sentence at
trial. Furthermore, they have extensive disposal powers. Only a small
percentage of cases received by public prosecutors result in fully ﬂedged
trials. In 2012, 5 million cases were brought to the attention of the pros-
ecution service (table 2). Of these, prosecution was legally possible in
only 1.3 million cases (such as identiﬁed suspect, sufﬁcient evidence,
statute of limitations). Prosecutors dismissed 141,000 cases (11 percent)
for legal policy reasons: withdrawal of complaint, mentally impaired sus-
pect, low-level harm, and so forth. Almost half of the cases (45 percent)
were settled by public prosecutors through alternatives to prosecution.
The remaining cases were tried by a criminal court, of which 140,561
went through a speedy “on-ﬁle” procedure called ordonnance pénale (dis-
cussed below) and 63,886 went through the French guilty plea proce-
dure (also discussed below).
TABLE 2
Case Disposal by Public Prosecutors: 2004–13
Recorded Crime Prosecutable Dismissed
Settled by
Prosecution
Tried by
Criminal Court
2004 5,399,181 1,455,657 366,414 414,721 674,522
2005 5,143,257 1,461,904 323,594 461,203 677,107
2006 5,311,024 1,526,396 299,459 519,110 707,827
2007 5,273,909 1,476,535 241,597 550,204 684,734
2008 5,101,119 1,500,411 219,520 611,945 668,946
2009 5,030,578 1,487,675 182,552 631,439 673,684
2010 4,966,994 1,260,428 139,856 529,728 590,814
2011 5,771,017 1,250,966 136,971 556,308 557,687
2012 4,982,173 1,293,189 141,252 583,369 568,568
2013 4,899,894 1,306,758 137,317 566,821 602,620
SOURCE.—Ministère de la Justice, Statistiques: Activité des parquets des TGI (http://
www.justice.gouv.fr/statistiques.html, accessed June 4, 2015).
NOTE.—The following terms are translated from the original source. Recorded crime:
plaintes et PV reçus; prosecutable: affaires poursuivables; dismissed: procédures classées sans suite;
settled by prosecution: procédures alternatives réussies and compositions pénales réussies; tried by
Criminal Court: poursuites.
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Recent years have seen the development of prosecutorial powers to
divert cases from court (Saas 2004; Hodgson 2012). Born from local
initiatives, alternatives to prosecution have become a criminal justice
pathway in their own right: they represented only 10 percent of prose-
cutorial decisions in cases cleared up in 1994 but one-third in 2000
(Aubert 2008) and almost half in 2012. Prosecutors can decide not to
prosecute a case but to engage alternatives to prosecution, such as warn-
ings (rappels à la loi), mediations, voluntary regularization or reparation,
and rehabilitation schemes, but also compositions pénales, which allow the
prosecutor to impose a ﬁnancial penalty or community work if the
suspect admits the offense (arts. 41-2 and 41-3 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, CPP). The execution of a composition pénale does not
formally count as a conviction. However, it prevents prosecution for
the same facts (ne bis in idem), and it forms part of the person’s crim-
inal record (art. 768 CPP). Even when prosecutors decide to prosecute
the suspect, they have a choice of procedures from which to select.
Introduced in 1972 for contraventions, the ordonnance pénale is a sum-
mary procedure in which no public hearing or debate takes place. The
judge makes her decision solely on the papers provided by the pros-
ecutor. This procedure was extended to certain délits in 2002 and is
par ticularly used in road trafﬁc cases. In 2012, it represented over
30 percent of prosecutions for délits (table 3). Inspired by common law
guilty pleas, the CRPC procedure (comparution sur reconnaissance pré-
alable de culpabilité ) was introduced in 2004 and progressively extended
to almost all délits (except for certain exclusions, such as serious and sex-
ual assaults). It allows the prosecutor to offer a sentence of up to 1 year
in prison or half of the maximum penalty if the defendant admits the
offense. In 2012, it represented over 13 percent of prosecutions for
délits.
This sentencing power given to the procureur in the composition pénale
and the CRPC procedures have been the objects of debate. In 1995, the
Conseil Constitutionnel struck down the injonction pénale, a predecessor
of the composition pénale, considering that a criminal sentence could not
be pronounced by a public prosecutor but required the intervention of
a judge (decision no. 95-360 DC 2 February 1995). A composition pénale
or a CRPC must therefore be validated by a judge, but this check by a
judge has been described as “quick,” “succinct,” or even “artiﬁcial,” un-
derlining that the judge can only accept or reject the sentence proposed
by the prosecutor and that a deeper check would go against the ob-
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jectives of rapidity for which the measures were ﬁrst introduced (Saas
2004; Hodgson 2012).
While procureurs belong to the same professional body as judges, the
defense lawyer has been described as a “professional outsider” and tra-
ditionally has a limited role in an inquisitorially based system (Hodgson
2005, p. 112). However, recent decades have seen a growing role of the
defense lawyer in France, ﬁrst at trial and, more recently, during the pre-
trial phase, inﬂuenced by decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR 14 October 2010, Brusco v France, no. 1466/07). That
said, lawyers’ role remains marginalized as, although they can now at-
tend, they must not intervene during police interrogation and are per-
mitted to put questions to the suspect only at the end of the interview
and to make observations that would then be attached to the case ﬁle.
Nonetheless, this can allow them to introduce mitigating elements in
favor of the suspect, such as pointing out that she has a stable lifestyle
with a job and family, which could inﬂuence the decision of the public
prosecutor. At trial, a fuller mitigation argument will be made by the de-
fense lawyer with regard to remorse, difﬁcult personal history, addic-
tion, and so forth. The court will also be informed by a probation report
and the defendant’s criminal record. The presence of defense lawyers
TABLE 3
Alternatives to Prosecution, Ordonnances Pénales, and CRPC: 2004–12
Prosecutions Alternatives to Prosecution
Ordonnances Pénales CRPC Compositions Pénales Other Alternatives
2004 58,822 2,187 25,777 388,944
2005 105,765 27,200 40,034 421,169
2006 129,577 50,250 51,065 468,045
2007 129,914 49,712 59,770 490,434
2008 136,124 56,326 67,230 544,715
2009 144,711 77,530 73,392 558,047
2010 126,997 69,232 65,460 464,268
2011 136,103 63,452 65,221 491,087
2012 140,561 63,886 73,241 510,128
2013 145,066 65,100 73,732 493,089
SOURCE.—Ministère de la Justice, Statistiques: Activité des parquets des TGI (http://
www.justice.gouv.fr/statistiques.html, accessed June 4, 2015).
NOTE.—Other alternatives include rappels à la loi (warnings), regularization/reparation,
and mediation.
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is mandatory for the CRPC hearing, and their role is crucial in negoti-
ating the sentence with the procureur and in advising their client whether
to accept the sentence being offered.
If the court ﬁnds the accused guilty, the trial judge will hand down the
sentence, having heard any mitigation from the defendant or her lawyer.
However, in some cases there will be a second stage to the sentencing
process, in which the JAP, responsible for the execution of the penalty,
will adapt the sentence to the needs of the individual offender in order to
make it more effective and to prevent reoffending. The JAP determines
the terms and conditions under which the sentence will be served. Arti-
cle 707 of the CCP provides that the sentence should be kept under re-
view and adapted depending on the evolution of the personality of the
convicted person and her ﬁnancial, familial, and social situation, which
must be evaluated regularly. This adaptation may consist of awarding
or removing sentence reductions to reﬂect good or bad behavior and
efforts made by the prisoner to reintegrate by, for example, passing
exams or improving her literacy skills. The JAP is also empowered to
commute short prison sentences to noncustodial alternatives before the
sentence has been served or to release the prisoner on probation or un-
der certain conditions toward the end of her sentence in order to pre-
pare for her permanent release.
B. Sentencing Patterns
Imprisonment and ﬁnes remain the principal punishment imposed by
French courts. Despite legislative creativity in establishing a range of
noncustodial sentences, they are used relatively rarely by French courts,
representing only about 10 percent of the sentences imposed in 2012
(table 4). They mainly comprise suspension of driving licenses, ﬁne days,
and community service (travail d’intérêt general, or TIG). They also in-
clude citizenship courses and the “reparation-sanction,” which forces
the offender to repair the damage caused to the victim, either through
ﬁnancial compensation or through reparation in kind or material repa-
ration. In 2012, over 66,000 noncustodial sentences were imposed,
including about 17,000 suspensions of driving licenses (25 percent),
24,271 ﬁne days (36 percent), and 16,588 community service sentences
(24 percent).
Between 2000 and 2014, the total number of prisoners rose from
51,441 (85 per 100,000 population) to 67,075 (101.6 per 100,000). This
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increase is due to the explosion of the number of prisoners serving short
sentences (see table 5). Whereas in 2000, inmates sentenced to over
5 years in prison represented 41.8 percent of the total with 13,856 pris-
oners, this proportion dropped to just 22.7 percent in 2014with 13,902 pris-
oners. Meanwhile, the number of inmates sentenced to less than a year
in prison has gone up from 8,365 in 2000 (25.3 percent) to 22,213 in
2014 (36.3 percent). Additionally, the number of prisoners sentenced
to between 1 and 3 years’ imprisonment jumped from 6,766 in 2000 to
18,288 in 2014. This trend could be explained by several factors includ-
ing a change in the structure of reported crime, the introduction of in-
creased sentences for road trafﬁc offenses, the introduction of manda-
tory minimum sentences for repeat offenders in 2007, and the abolition
of the practice of mass pardons by former President Sarkozy from 2007.
Mass pardons traditionally took place every year on Bastille Day, but the
TABLE 5
Prison Sentences Quantum for Délits: 2000–2014
!1 Year 1–3 Years 3–5 Years 15 Years
Number % Number % Number % Number % Total
2000 8,365 25.3 6,766 20.4 4,139 12.5 13,856 41.8 33,126
2001 7,739 24.5 6,128 19.4 3,562 11.3 14,202 44.9 31,631
2002 9,301 28.7 6,599 20.3 3,300 10.2 13,244 40.8 32,444
2003 9,875 28.6 7,936 23.0 3,468 10.0 13,250 38.4 34,529
2004 10,954 29.2 8,835 23.6 4,357 11.6 13,333 35.6 37,479
2005 11,504 29.5 8,929 22.9 4,569 11.7 14,039 36.0 39,041
2006 12,146 30.5 8,810 22.1 4,486 11.3 14,342 36.0 39,784
2007 15,141 36.1 8,445 20.1 4,295 10.2 14,035 33.5 41,916
2008 17,371 36.8 11,025 23.4 4,644 9.8 14,161 30.0 47,201
2009 17,422 34.7 13,716 27.3 5,103 10.2 14,002 27.9 50,243
2010 17,445 34.4 14,174 28.0 5,628 11.1 13,442 26.5 50,689
2011 17,535 34.2 14,780 28.8 5,709 11.1 13,248 25.8 51,272
2012 20,641 35.9 17,226 30.0 6,202 10.8 13,428 23.4 57,497
2013 21,961 36.4 18,169 30.1 6,647 11.0 13,563 22.5 60,340
2014 22,213 36.3 18,288 29.9 6,858 11.2 13,902 22.7 61,261
SOURCE.—Ministère de la Justice, Séries statistiques des personnes placées sous main de justice
1980–2014, p. 35 (http://www.justice.gouv.fr/prison-et-reinsertion-10036/les-chiffres-clefs
-10041/series-statistiques-des-personnes-placees-sous-main-de-justice-26147.html, accessed
September 8, 2014).
NOTE.—The total represents the stock of inmates on January 1 of each year who were
convicted for a délit (middle-ranking offense).
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constitutional reform of July 23, 2008, restricted the right of the presi-
dent to grant a pardon to individual cases only. Kensey and Ouss (2011)
found that, on average, prisoners released between May 1996 and April
1997 were relieved of an average of 8 percent of their sentences as a re-
sult of mass pardons. Forty-three percent beneﬁted from at least one
pardon during their sentence. Since 2007, such reductions in sentence
do not occur.
Since the Second World War when the ﬁles were kept by the French
police recording the names and addresses of Jewish people from 1940 (in
the occupied zone) and 1941 (in the nonoccupied zone) (on the discov-
ery of these ﬁles in 1991–92, see Combe [1994]), French ofﬁcial statistics
contain no references to race, religion, or ethnicity; only nationality is
recorded. Whereas nonnationals constitute around 6 percent of the gen-
eral population in France, they represented 19 percent of prisoners
(including people under electronic tagging and external placements) in
France on January 1, 2015 (Ministère de la Justice 2015, p. 6). Yet, this
proportion has decreased signiﬁcantly as nonnationals represented over
30 percent of inmates in January 1994. By contrast, non-French people
represented 5.6 percent of offenders serving a noncustodial sentence on
January 1, 2015 (p. 8). The vast majority of foreigners in French prisons
come from Africa (49.1 percent, particularly former French colonies in
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the European Union (38 percent).
There is very little research on the impact of nationality, ethnicity, or
immigration status on the treatment of defendants in the French crim-
inal justice system. Body-Gendrot (2014) compiled existing research on
the subject and concluded that the overrepresentation of non-French
in the criminal justice process may result from wrongful bias; but dis-
parities could also be explained by socioeconomic disadvantages or dif-
ferences in records of past criminality. Roché, Gordon, and Depuiset
(2014) conducted a study on the impact of ethnicity on sentencing in
two juvenile courts between 1984 and 2005. Although they found some
evidence of sentencing bias, they did not discover massive and systematic
discrimination based on ethnicity.
C. Sentencing Policy Trends (1994–2014)
The relevant provisions of the Code Pénal (CP, Criminal Code) and
the course of their recent development are discussed in detail through-
out this essay. It may be useful, however, to provide a brief overview of
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some of the most signiﬁcant legislative and statistical trends and the legal
and political forces that have shaped them. The CP is the core text gov-
erning French sentencing; but as governments change, sentencing re-
form is characterized by swings between putting in place either more re-
habilitative or more repressive measures, depending on the political hue
of each administration. The ﬁrst codiﬁcation of criminal law since 1810
(a variety of amendments were made, but the same code remained in
place), the new CP introduced in 1994 merely brought the ﬁnishing
touches to the sentencing developments of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. It ratiﬁed the wide discretionary sentencing powers progres-
sively given to judges throughout the years. Judges are virtually unfet-
tered in their choice of the nature and quantum of the sentence, and they
do not have to give reasons for their sentencing decisions (art. 132-
17 CP). The Cour de Cassation, France’s highest criminal court, repeat-
edly asserted that, with regard to sentencing decisions and as long as
they remain within the boundaries of the law, judges have an absolute
discretion for which they cannot be made accountable (Cass. Crim.,
28 January 1991, no. 89-84987). In order to ﬁght the proliferation of
short prison sentences, the CP introduced a limited obligation to give
reasons for the imposition of a nonsuspended prison sentence for délits
(art. 132-19 CP). Chassaing (1993) also criticized the CP for not revising
the sentence maximums, leaving them in many instances very high, on
the grounds that they were merely symbolic and were never imposed
in practice. The new CP also reafﬁrmed the principle of the individual-
ization of sentences to the circumstances and to the character of the
offender, dedicating a whole section of the code to this. It retained the
alternatives to imprisonment introduced in 1975 (Loi no. 75-624 of
11 July 1975 introduced sentences involving the forfeiture or restriction
of rights, such as suspension of driving license, conﬁscation of vehicle)
and 1983 (Loi no. 83-466 of 10 June 1983 created the TIG [unpaid work
in the community] and the ﬁne day) but failed to include them within
offense deﬁnitions, which continued to refer only to imprisonment and
ﬁnes. The new CP also neglected to deﬁne sentencing rationales. It fell
to the Constitutional Court to conﬁrm that prison sentences aim both
to reform and to reintegrate the offender (decision no. 93-334 DC of
20 January 1994).
Since the acceptance of the new CP, particularly from 2002, crime
control political rhetoric has progressively dominated the French public
debate on criminal justice reform with some impact on sentencing policy
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(Salas 2005; Garapon and Salas 2007). However, more rehabilitative in-
spirations have had a role in the separate phase of sentence execution,
which has remained more sheltered from the inﬂuence of penal popu-
lism.
1. The Dominance of Crime Control Ideas. The 2002 French presiden-
tial campaign focused on insecurity and zero tolerance. The Front Na-
tional, the extreme Right party, made it to the second round of the elec-
tion. Nicolas Sarkozy, ﬁrst as minister of the interior (2002–7) and then
as president of the Republic (2007–12), clearly positioned himself as the
defender of victims. Defending his vision of crime policy in a 2012
speech to judges and public prosecutors, he declared, “the judicial insti-
tution, is ﬁrst and foremost the institution of victims. And you, as ma-
gistrats, you work for them ﬁrst and foremost” (Robert-Diard 2012).
As a result, his crime policy has been criticized for too closely reﬂect-
ing high-proﬁle crime stories (Salas 2005; Garapon and Salas 2007;
Mucchielli 2008; Wyvekens 2010). Referring to crime policy reform be-
tween 2002 and 2007, Mucchielli (2008) describes a “security frenzy.”
During this period, 30 legislative acts amended the CP and 40 amended
the CPP.Numerous new offenses were created (seeDanet [2008, pp. 21–
22] for an overview). Maximum sentences were also increased, either
directly—the law of 18 March 2003 increased sentences applicable
to many road trafﬁc offenses—or through the introduction of new ag-
gravating circumstances. The ﬁght against repeat offending also shaped
the adoption of several successive acts. The Act of 12 December 2005
widened the scope of equivalent offenses taken into account for the ag-
gravating circumstance of repeat offending to apply and reduced the
sentence discount automatically available—barring bad behavior—for
recidivists. The reluctance of the ministry of justice to constrain judicial
discretion meant that Sarkozy failed to impose minimum sentences for
recidivists as minister of the interior. Once he was elected president,
however, the law of 10 August 2007 introducing these mandatory min-
imums was one of the ﬁrst legislative acts pushed through by his govern-
ment. Although controversial, these peines planchers were later extended
to offenses of serious violence by the law of 14 March 2011.
An important development was a new philosophy mixing repression
and treatment within a single measure as a new means of reducing recid-
ivism. The law of 17 June 1998 introduced the suivi socio-judiciaire, which
allows for judicial—and even medical—control of sexual offenders after
their release from prison. It involves several obligations, in particular,
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bans from certain locations and from carrying out activities in contact
with children and an obligation to seek psychiatric treatment. Failure
to respect those obligations is sanctioned by imprisonment. The 1998
law met with cross-party approval: it was voted by a left-wing majority
in Parliament but found its origins in a bill proposed by the outgoing
right-wing government just months before. This particular focus on
dangerous offenders, mixing repression and treatment in a single mea-
sure, has continued through several subsequent laws. The Act of 12 De-
cember 2005 introduced judicial surveillance of dangerous offenders;
the person is placed under the control of a judge, who can require the
offender to report any change of address to probation, to seek medical
treatment, to wear an electronic tag, or to be under house arrest (for
people sentenced to over 15 years in prison). In addition, a psychiatric
report is necessary to establish dangerousness and to check whether
medical treatment is appropriate. The law of 25 February 2008 intro-
duced the rétention de sûreté, which allows the continued detention af-
ter sentencing of those considered to be dangerous and at a high risk
of reoffending because of a serious personality disorder. The Act of
10 March 2010 required sexual offenders to undertake a hormonal treat-
ment called “chemical castration.” These laws have been denounced as
“confusing mental illness and criminality, dangerousness and recidivism”
(Herzog-Evans 2011, p. 100). When these two conﬂicting notions of
responsibility are mixed together—criminal culpability and mental ill-
ness—the responses of treatment and of punishment also risk being con-
fused: offenders are treated and the mentally ill are punished (Wyvekens
2010). The effects of these new legal provisions and the number of peo-
ple affected are not yet known, as they apply to offenders sentenced to
long periods of imprisonment (e.g., over 15 years for the retention de
sûreté ) toward the end of their sentence.
2. Rehabilitative Inspirations. Until 1958, the role of the judge was
limited to the imposition of the sentence at the close of the trial; after
that, the administration of sentences was left to prisons. In 1958, the
CPP established the JAP to oversee the execution of prison sentences.
Since then, their role has grown. This redeﬁnition of sentence execution
as a judicial function contrasts with the administrative control of sen-
tence execution in common law countries. For example, in England and
Wales, the parole board, the body that carries out risk assessment of
prisoners to determine who may safely be released into the community,
is an independent administrative authority.
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The JAP’s role in sentence execution has seen a signiﬁcant increase
since 2000 because of contextual but also structural causes. The incar-
ceration of politicians, businessmen, and various celebrities from the
mid-1990s, together with the publication in 2000 of a book written by
a doctor working in a famous Paris prison (Vasseur 2000), placed the
conditions of detention in French prisons ﬁrmly under the spotlight.
A new interest was taken in violations of human dignity in prisons, in
particular because of the state of overcrowding. Parliamentary com-
missions were tasked to report on the conditions of detention in French
prisons (Commission d’Enquête de l’Assemblée Nationale 2000; Com-
mission d’Enquête du Sénat 2000). The return to a crime control ideol-
ogy from 2002 mainly affected the substantive criminal law and criminal
procedure, and the less visible terrain of sentence execution was largely
untouched as the focus was of necessity on dealing with the persistent
problem of overcrowding. Furthermore, parole and other sentence ad-
justments were no longer perceived as privileges for offenders anymore,
but as tools to prevent recidivism (Warsmann 2003). Further structural
causes linked to the legal context can also be identiﬁed. Thus, the inclu-
sion by the European Court of Human Rights of sentence reductions
within the scope of article 6, paragraph 1 ECHR in its Campbell and
Fell decision (1984) and the decision in 1995 by the Conseil d’État to
open disciplinary sanctions in prison to judicial review (CE, 17 February
1995, Marie) seem also to have played an important role in cementing
the role of the JAP.
Studying people released betweenMay 1996 and April 1997, Tournier
and Kensey (2001) showed that, on average, prisoners served 69 per-
cent of their imposed sentence, with 27 percent of the discount due to
discretionary sentence discounts and 4 percent to parole decisions. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the only study on sentences actually
served. Since 2004, each offender sentenced to imprisonment is given
automatic sentence reduction credits. The credits are calculated on the
basis of the nonsuspended sentence as 3 months for the ﬁrst year and
2 months for the remaining years or 7 days per month for shorter
sentences. The JAP can withdraw sentence reduction credits for bad be-
havior up to a maximum of 3 months per year or 7 days per month.
Prisoners can receive further sentence reductions for “serious efforts of
social readaptation” (art. 721-1CPP), such as passing an exam or learning
to read and write. In addition, the Acts of 15 June 2000 and 9March 2004
greatly increased the JAP’s powers, allowing them to adjust sentences
238 Jacqueline Hodgson and Laurène Soubise
to take into account the evolution of the offender’s situation and per-
sonality (art. 707 CPP). They are also permitted to commute short
prison sentences to noncustodial sentences before they have been served
(art. 723-15 CPP). Article 707 CPP speciﬁes that “sentence execution
favors, within the respect of society’s interests and the rights of the vic-
tim, the integration or the reintegration of convicted persons, as well
as the prevention of recidivism.” By contrast to the more crime control–
oriented policies described above, the Act of 24 November 2009 accen-
tuated this rehabilitative objective by allowing sentences up to 2 years
long to be adjusted prior to being served.
II. The Law of 15 August 2014
This context of a growing prison population and tensions between re-
pressive and rehabilitative objectives, as well as the access to power of
a new governing party in 2012, called for a new reform of French sen-
tencing. The new sentencing law of 15 August 2014 is not revolutionary;
it is in line with established historical principles of French sentencing,
principles that many have argued were called into question by the re-
forms of the previous administration. The new law establishes a solid
foundation by articulating the sentencing rationales of the criminal jus-
tice system. Prior to this, article 132-24 of the Code Pénal attempted to
reconcile several sentencing aims and functions by providing that “the
nature, quantum and regime of imposed sentences are set so as to recon-
cile the effective protection of society, the punishment of the offender
and the interests of the victim with the necessity to promote the integra-
tion or reintegration of the convicted person and to prevent the commis-
sion of new offenses.”
The article was buried in the depths of the Code Pénal’s sentencing
provisions. The law of 15 August 2014 creates a new article 130-1 CP,
placed at the start of the code’s section on sentencing. It stipulates that
“in order to ensure the protection of society, to prevent the commission
of new offenses and to restore the social balance, while respecting the
interests of the victim, the sentence has the following functions: ‘1. To
punish the offender; and 2. To promote his reform, his integration or
his reintegration.’”
The new article 130-1 articulates an ideology in which punitive and
rehabilitative objectives are not opposed, as the drafting of article 132-
24 had suggested, but are complementary. There is no political consen-
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sus on sentencing aims in France, and the wording of the new article was
criticized during its parliamentary debate as evidence of a permissive
ideology underpinning the law, which puts on an equal footing the
two objectives of punishment and reintegration of the convicted person.
The opposition contended that sentences must ﬁrst and foremost re-
mind offenders of the consequences of infringing the law. The Consen-
sus Commission, whose recommendations formed the basis of the bill,
and the government disagreed. The new law gives expression to the view
that the punishment of the offender cannot be the sole aim of sentenc-
ing; the objective of rehabilitation is an essential part of the battle against
recidivism. In this section, we examine two themes that have shaped the
French sentencing debate of recent years and make a further appearance
in the new law: the individualization of sentences and place of imprison-
ment within French sentencing.
A. Individualization, Judicial Discretion, and Minimum Sentencing
The new act reafﬁrms what has become the central principle in French
sentencing: the principle of individualization, which gives wide discre-
tionary powers to the sentencing judge by requiring her to tailor the
sentence to the offender. The centrality of this principle is the result of
historical developments over two centuries. In reaction to the arbitrari-
ness of the prerevolutionary ancien régime, the 1789 Déclaration des
Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (DDHC—Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of Citizens) expressed the principles of proportionality and
of legality in its article 8: “The Lawmust prescribe only the punishments
that are strictly and evidently necessary; and no one may be punished ex-
cept by virtue of a Law drawn up and promulgated before the offense is
committed, and legally applied.”
The ﬁrst criminal code of 1791 promulgated ﬁxed sentences, denying
any discretionary power to the judge. This was in line with the revolu-
tionary impetus for curbing the power of judges who were considered as
nothing more than “the mouth of the law,” as Montesquieu put it in The
Spirit of the Laws (1748, bk. XI, chap. 6). The 1810 criminal code aban-
doned ﬁxed sentences, instead providing minimums and maximums: for
instance, assaults were punished by imprisonment between 15 days and
a year and a ﬁne between 500 and 20,000 francs (art. 320). Promoted
by liberal lawyers and reformers, the law of 28 April 1832 introduced
the mechanism of extenuating circumstances, which allowed the court
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to depart from minimum sentences imposed by the Code Pénal, tak-
ing into account the personality of the accused or the circumstances
of the offense. The principle of individualization was theorized at the
end of the nineteenth century by Raymond Saleilles, who argued that
it was not possible to set sentences rigidly in advance, since they should
be adapted to individual circumstances rather than deﬁned in a purely
abstract law, ignoring the diversity of cases and individuals (Ottenhof
2001). The principle was strengthened throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, in particular, with the consideration of the age of the offender and
the creation of a separate regime for juveniles, culminating with the
new Code Pénal, which came into force in 1994. Minimum sentences
were removed entirely, and a whole new section was dedicated to “the
personalization of sentences.” The Conseil Constitutionnel (French Con-
stitutional Court) granted constitutional status to the principle of in-
dividualization, inferring this from the principles of proportionality and
necessity found in article 8 DDHC, which has been part of the French
Constitution since 1958 (decision no. 2005-520 DC of 22 July 2005,
para. 3).
The introduction of the peines planchers (minimum sentences) in 2007
was seen as a challenge to this principle of individualization, as it limited
the power of judges to adapt the sentence to the personal circumstances
of repeat offenders. Judges were permitted to depart from these mini-
mums only if they could demonstrate special circumstances, such as
“exceptional guarantees of reintegration” (former art. 132-18-1 CP).
However, when called on to rule on the constitutionality of this reform,
the Conseil Constitutionnel considered that the principle of individual-
ization was not an obstacle to the legislator ﬁxing rules ensuring the ef-
fective repression of offenses, and it did not imply that the sentence had
to be determined entirely according to the individual’s characteristics
(decision no. 2007-554 DC of 9 August 2007, para. 13).
Some commentators welcomed this constraint on the principle of in-
dividualization, which they believed could lead to great inequalities be-
tween offenders. Pradel (2007), for example, has argued in favor of the
introduction of “Anglo-Saxon sentencing guidelines” to promote har-
monization between courts. He claimed that the peines planchers moved
toward greater certainty of sentences, a powerful deterrent against re-
peat offending. Others, such as Herzog-Evans (2007), argued that the
new mechanism did not make sentencing more certain, but simply more
severe. Furthermore, experiments in other jurisdictions suggest that, as
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a sentencing policy, minimum sentences are destined to fail: the US ex-
perience has been an explosion in the prison population, with no effect
on reducing criminality or repeat offending.
The Consensus Commission conducted a close examination of the
peines planchers. They heard evidence from a range of experts—including
legal academics, criminologists, and sociologists, and also practitioners
such as magistrats, probation ofﬁcers, and psychiatrists—and examined
the ﬁndings of earlier research studies. They concluded that there was
no scientiﬁc evidence to suggest that the peines planchers were effective
in preventing recidivism and furthermore that they had noticeably con-
tributed to prison overcrowding. The commission asserted that it was
right to give judges broad discretion in sentencing, emphasizing that
“their decision should not be constrained in any way by a minimum sen-
tence which does not take into account the whole background of the in-
dividual concerned, the nature of offenses and the necessary individual-
ization of the sentence” (Conférence de Consensus 2013, p. 11). The Act
of 15 August 2014 reafﬁrms this principle in article 132-1 CP, which
states that “any sentence imposed by the court must be individualized.
Within the limits set by law, the court sets the nature, quantum and re-
gime of pronounced sentences according to the circumstances of the of-
fense and the personality of the offender, as well as her material, familial
and social situation.” It repeals all minimum sentences. It also abolishes
the automatic revocation of suspended sentences in case of a new convic-
tion, giving judges the discretion “to avoid inappropriate blind revo-
cations.” The clear policy that emerges is a strict application of the in-
dividualization principle, reafﬁrming the total discretion of the judge.
This wide judicial discretion is at odds with the international trend to-
ward greater regulation of sentencing through mandatory standards or
guidelines. The desire for consistency and predictability of sentences
is felt elsewhere, so why not in France?
One explanation might be the absence of wide variations in sentenc-
ing, in contrast with other countries. Several factors could be perceived
as favoring sentencing uniformity in France. The most obvious factor is
provided by the control of individual discretion through the broad right
of both defense and prosecution to appeal against the sentence imposed
in ﬁrst instance (unfortunately, no data are available showing the pro-
portion of appealed decisions or the success rate). Furthermore, the ex-
ercise of judicial discretion is less solitary in France, where three judges
often sit together, compared with, for example, England and Wales. Al-
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though there has been a great increase in the number of offenses that can
be tried by a single judge, those judges are accustomed to making sen-
tencing decisions collectively. Another guarantee against variations is
that, in contrast to England and Wales, public prosecutors recommend
a sentence in court and are part of the magistrature (French career judi-
ciary), the same professional body as judges.
In an extensive 2013 study of sentencing decisions in ﬁve different
court centers, Saas, Lorvellec, and Gautron (2013) demonstrated the
symmetry that exists between sentences called for by public prosecutors
and the sentences actually imposed by the court; for example, the court
imposed a ﬁne when it had been requested by the prosecutor in 91.6 per-
cent of cases (p. 171). Faget (2008, p. 23) has also commented on the
common “invisible judicial culture” in which those legal actors work.
The common training and membership of the same professional body
create strong bonds and a common outlook among magistrats, who are
already characterized by a strong social resemblance (Hodgson 2005,
pp. 69–70). Faget also noted that the appraisal of all judges by a hierar-
chical superior in order to determine career progression contributes to a
“culture of obedience” that encouraged conformity of behaviors and
decisions (2008, p. 11).
Saas, Lorvellec, and Gautron do not provide detailed tables for each
court center in their 2013 study because of a lack of space but provide
some further support for their conclusions in the comments of a public
prosecutor who worked in several courts and found a remarkable degree
of consistency in sentencing practices. By contrast, a journalist evoked
“a national lottery” when referring to variations in judicial decisions (Si-
monnot 2003). Mucchielli and Raquet (2014) also found some variations
in sentencing in their study of comparutions immédiates in Nice, by com-
parison with similar studies in Lyon and Toulouse. Similarly, Roché,
Gordon, and Depuiset’s (2014) study of serious crime cases in juvenile
courts showed important variations between courts and signiﬁcant dif-
ferences across sentenced individuals.
A better explanation for the broad acceptance of the principle of indi-
vidualization is provided by French legal culture. In contrasting the per-
vasiveness and visibility of character evidence in French trials, with the
separation of character from the case facts in England and Wales, Field
(2006, pp. 544–45) points to the vision of relations between state and cit-
izen very different from that of Anglo-Saxon liberalism: “Character ev-
idence in England and Wales is marginalized to emphasize that punish-
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ment and censure relates to the particular crime charged and not to
a more broad-ranging judgment of the standing of the accused in the
community. . . . In France, the trial is presented as part of a process of
rehabilitating the accused as a citizen of the state. The legitimacy of that
notion of criminal trial is related to the legitimacy of a positive concept
of the citizen against which it is appropriate to judge the character and
life of the accused.”Different concepts of the relationship of the individ-
ual to society help explain why the individualization of the sentence has
become such a fundamental starting point in France in a way that it has
not in common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales.
One of the most striking features of the French criminal justice pro-
cess for common law researchers is the unitary structure of the trial. In
common law jurisdictions, the ﬁnding of guilt is often separated from
sentencing: in England andWales, for example, in the more serious con-
tested cases, it is a function of different actors in the Crown Court—the
jury decides on guilt, while the judge decides on the sentence. This sep-
aration does not exist in magistrates’ court cases, however, where the
magistrates or district judge determines both sentence and verdict. The
Crown Prosecutor makes no recommendation as to sentence beyond
sentence type; she may argue for a custodial sentence, for example, but
not for a speciﬁc term.
In France, however, guilt and sentence are discussed at the same time,
and the procureur makes arguments as to both, with a precise sentence
recommendation. This has important consequences for the criminal
justice system. For instance, an English or American researcher would
struggle to recognize the common law guilty plea procedure in the
French version of the CRPC. This is partly due to the negotiation that
takes place between the public prosecutor and the defendant, not so
much on guilt—an admission at the police station is usually necessary
to go down this procedural pathway—but on sentence. Interestingly,
the 2014 act introduced the formal separation of ﬁnding of guilt and
sentencing at the trial stage. In order to encourage judges to tailor sen-
tences to offenders, the new law introduces the possibility for judges
to adjourn the sentencing decision after the ﬁnding of guilt (art. 132-
70-1 CP). The court can ask the probation service for further informa-
tion about the personality of the offender or her material, familial, or
social situation. This innovation could prove the most revolutionary
aspect of the 2014 law, depending on the use judges make of this new
possibility.
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B. Centrality or Subsidiarity of Imprisonment in French Sentencing?
In a bid to convince judges to impose noncustodial sentences, the Act
of 15 August 2014 reiterates the idea that imprisonment should be a
sentence of last resort. A new paragraph of article 132-19 CP now af-
ﬁrms that “a nonsuspended sentence of imprisonment can only be pro-
nounced in last resort if the seriousness of the offense and the character
of the offender make this sentence necessary and if any other sanction is
clearly unsuitable.” It makes it mandatory for judges to justify their de-
cision to sentence a defendant to imprisonment taking into account “the
circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender, as well as
his material, familial and social situation.” However, the law is far from
innovative, as this wording is an exact replica of the third paragraph of
article 132-24 CP introduced by Sarkozy’s government in 2009 (Loi
no. 2009-1436 of 24 November 2009 pénitentiaire). The new law merely
abolishes the exception created by the December 2005 law that allowed
courts not to provide any justiﬁcations for imposing prison sentences in
cases of repeat offending.
Since the 1970s, keen to promote alternatives to custody to resolve
prison overcrowding, successive governments have introduced a pleth-
ora of new sentences. Over the years, noncustodial sentences have slowly
piled up: ﬁne days, community service (TIG), electronic tagging, and so
on, but also a myriad of punishments that involve the forfeiture or re-
striction of rights (suspension or invalidation of driving license, prohibi-
tion to exercise a commercial or industrial profession, exclusion from
certain places [e.g., licensed premises], prohibition from contacting cer-
tain people [e.g., victim or coaccused], bans from carrying arms, bans
from using checks or payment cards, impounding or conﬁscation of a
thing). Suspended sentences also come in various forms: sursis simple
(a simple suspension, with only the condition that the offender should
not reoffend), sursis mise à l’épreuve (SME—with numerous possible con-
ditions, such as keeping in touch with a probation ofﬁcer, medical treat-
ment, etc.), and sursis-TIG (with the condition to do community work).
More recently, the Act of 9 March 2004 introduced citizenship courses
and the Act of 5 March 2007 created the sanction-réparation that forces
the offender to pay compensation to the victim.
Yet, despite all these legislative efforts, imprisonment remains the
sentence of choice, although those sentences are typically not served in
full because of the automatic sentence reductions detailed above. When
ordonnances pénales that do not allow for imprisonment sentences are
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excluded, imprisonment sentences represent 63 percent of convictions
(37 percent—totally suspended sentence; 26 percent—not suspended
or partially suspended; “Étude d’impact du projet de loi relatif à la pré-
vention de la récidive et à l’individualisation des peines” [2013, p. 18]).
Although this is difﬁcult to measure, some authors have suggested that
the multiplication of noncustodial sentences has had a net-widening ef-
fect, as the new sentences apply to cases in which another noncustodial
sentence would have been imposed without reducing the imprisonment
rate (Herzog-Evans 2013). The gradual stacking up of noncustodial
sentences has created a tangled undergrowth in which even professionals
get lost. Deﬁnitions of offenses indicate only the maximum term of im-
prisonment and the maximum ﬁne that can be imposed for each offense,
but the legislator has also authorized judges to impose alternative non-
custodial sentences instead. Judges have to refer to separate provisions
to make sure that the alternative sentence they are considering is indeed
applicable to the speciﬁc offense they are dealing with. Some critics argue
that, as a result of this, judges and prosecutors tend to stick with the fa-
miliarity of imprisonment and ﬁnes to avoid venturing into the maze
of alternative sentences (Saas 2010).
The new Act of 15 August 2014 creates a new probation sentence: the
contrainte pénale. The new sentence will apply only to adult offenders,
not to juveniles, and is aimed at offenders who need “personalized and
sustained socioeducative support” (new art. 131-4-1 CP). Under this
sentence, the convicted person is the subject of measures of control
and assistance for a period between 6 months and 5 years. The probation
service will have to draw up its proposed measures for the offender and
submit them to the sentencing judge (the JAP; see below for a detailed
account of the process). The new law provides for regular reevaluation
of the measures in place, taking into account the evolution of the situa-
tion, which could even result in the sentence being ended earlier than
originally planned.
The creation of this new sentence gives effect to recommendations of
the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe’s Recommendation on
Probation Rules was adopted on January 20, 2010, and deﬁnes probation
as “the implementation in the community of sanctions and measures,
deﬁned by law and imposed on an offender. It includes a range of activ-
ities and interventions, which involve supervision, guidance and assis-
tance aiming at the social inclusion of an offender, as well as at contrib-
uting to community safety” (Recommendation CM/Rec [2010] 1). Yet
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there already exist several sanctions in the French sentencing system
that ﬁt within this description, in particular, TIG and SME, but more
broadly any sentence that imposes obligations on the offender. It has
been argued that the SME was a better solution, as it is more ﬂexible
and easier to use, in particular, in cases in which the offender does not
respect the obligations imposed on her by the probation service (Herzog-
Evans 2013). Under the SME, the failure to respect obligations can lead
to the revocation by the JAP of the suspended prison sentence orig-
inally imposed by the court. The new law provides for a complicated
process in cases of failure to respect the obligations imposed under a
contrainte pénale: the court that imposes the contrainte pénale must pro-
vide the maximum prison sentence that can be imposed for failure to
respect the obligations (art. 131-4-1 CP); if the offender fails to respect
her obligations, the JAP can remind her of these obligations or modify
them (art. 713-47 CPP); if that is insufﬁcient, the JAP can apply to an-
other judge to decide the length of the prison sentence that the offender
will have to serve, within the maximum provided by the original sentenc-
ing court (art. 713-47 CPP).
By creating a new noncustodial sentence on top of those already in ex-
istence, the new law can be criticized for adding a layer of complexity
and for failing to respond to the criticisms expressed against existing al-
ternative sentences detailed above, in particular, that introducing new
sentences has not had much effect on the ground. This has been recog-
nized by the government itself, which states in the impact study of its
bill that noncustodial sentences represent about 15 percent of imposed
sentences, 66 percent of which are ﬁne days (“Étude d’impact du projet
de loi relatif à la prévention de la récidive et à l’individualisation des
peines” [2013]). The Consensus Commission recommended the inclu-
sion of all the existing sentences imposing obligations on the offender
under a new probation sentence. This would have had the advantage
of simpliﬁcation, but it was considered too onerous in terms of resources.
The government decided to reserve the contrainte pénale for offenders in
need of intense support, keeping other alternative sentences for those for
whom a lighter touch is sufﬁcient. It remains to be seen whether this
added layer of complexity will deter judges further from imposing non-
custodial sentences. The government considered going further and re-
placing references to imprisonment with the contrainte pénale in the def-
inition of speciﬁc offenses, thus forcing judges to impose it instead of
prison. It decided against this, as it would have meant reducing the scope
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of the new sentence to a limited number of offenses instead of targeting
offenders who need special support. However, the door has not been
completely closed to this proposition, as article 20 of the law provides
that the government should report to Parliament within 2 years of the
law coming into effect, to examine the possibility of replacing imprison-
ment with the contrainte pénale for certain offenses.
III. The Sentence as Process
To the English observer, the French approach to sentencing has a
number of striking features that mark it out as very different from that
in England and Wales, where responsibility for passing sentence rests
squarely with the trial judge. The court in England andWales sentences
the accused after hearing the prosecution case, any mitigation from the
defense, the accused’s previous criminal convictions, and information on
the person’s work and social circumstances. Typically, where there has
been a “not guilty” plea, the court will adjourn after the decision to con-
vict in order to gather more information to inform its sentencing deci-
sion. The sentence is announced in open court along with reasons for
the choice and severity of the penalty. Apart from rules allowing for
early release from prison, the sentence pronounced in court is the sen-
tence served. The French system also differs strikingly from American
practices in which, in theory, sentencing decisions are for the judge to
make, but in practice, all but 3–5 percent of convictions result from
guilty pleas in which the sentence is effectively negotiated between the
prosecutor and the defense counsel, with the prosecutor’s voice almost
always being determinative (e.g., Lynch 2003).
In France, the position is rather different: the sentence imposed by
the trial judge may simply be the starting point in determining the sen-
tence that will be carried out. Sentencing is not a single event but an on-
going process, through which penalties can be adapted weeks or months
after conviction, in a closed hearing with a procureur and a sentencing
judge, the JAP. This might include substituting a noncustodial measure
in place of a short prison term or altering the way in which imprison-
ment is served—allowing the convicted person to continue in employ-
ment, for example. The rationale is to ensure that the sentence is appro-
priate to the individual and so is effective in preventing reoffending and
assisting in the individual’s reinsertion into society. For less serious sen-
tences, this process will begin immediately after the trial and court sen-
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tence. For those serving more than 2 years in prison (art. 723-15 CPP), it
will take place toward the end of their sentence. In short, the sentence
pronounced in court may be very different from the sentence that will
be served in practice.
Before we tease out some of the underlying assumptions and practices
revealed through this approach, a few examples from recent research
provide a sense of these hearings and the scope of this sentence adapta-
tion and adjustment (see also Padﬁeld [2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d ] for
further brief examples).3 Present at all of the hearings were the JAP,
the procureur, and a court clerk. The ﬁrst three cases took place in the
chambers of the JAP.
Case one concerned a man sentenced to 18 months in prison for the
sexual assault of his daughter. He applied to serve his sentence by being
electronically tagged, and the probation service recommended the route
of semi-liberté, which requires the person to spend each night in prison
but allows her to go to work during the day as part of a strict schedule
of her movements. The JAP checked the employment schedule and that
the person had been attending his medical treatment appointments as re-
quired. The JAP asked the man how the treatment was going and how
things were with his children. The procureur suggested that he begin ex-
ecuting the sentence when he returned from holiday with his family.
Procureur: There is something else I would like to speak to you
about. I know you have problems with alcohol and you would like
to beneﬁt from the semi-liberté system but I need you to realize
that you cannot come back to prison in the evening completely
drunk. You need to be very careful.
JAP: Do you understand what the procureur is saying? It is
important.
[Convicted person explains that he is trying to get a place in a rehabil-
itation program.]
JAP: I think we could delay the sentence execution to allow you to
do this. What do you think?
3 These are the observations of Laurène Soubise in the course of her current PhD ﬁeld-
work examining the independence and accountability of prosecutors in France and in
England and Wales.
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Convicted person: I think it would help me.
Procureur: I’m not opposed to it. Obligation to get medical treat-
ment is essential.
JAP: Is there anything else you would like to add?
Convicted person: I’ve already paid 50 euros towards compensation.
I’m going to leave my ﬂat when I go to prison so I will be able
to pay more.
Procureur: You’re going to leave your ﬂat? Are you sure it’s a
good idea? Where will you go when you have permission to be on
leave? We need to have a stable address if we let you come out of
prison occasionally!
[He explains that he will stay with a family member.]
Case two concerned a man sentenced to 5 months in prison for theft
and assaulting a police ofﬁcer. The probation service reported that the
man’s behavior had been problematic and he had been complaining that
justice is too slow. Both the procureur and the JAP lectured the man
about his behavior: he was not the victim here; he chose to commit
the offenses. The man went on to say that he had no income and so
could not pay compensation to the victims.
JAP: I won’t adjust your sentence without compensation to
victims. I don’t take into account just your interests when deciding
whether or not to adjust your sentence, but also society’s interests
and the interests of the victims.
Procureur: You were sentenced to do some community work and
you didn’t do it. You were sentenced to prison because of that
and now we are trying to adjust this prison sentence. You are not
showing that you have made any effort; you need to improve your
attitude quickly, otherwise you will go to prison.
Case three concerned a man sentenced to 3 months in prison for
possession of cannabis, who was asking for this to be commuted to
unpaid work. He could not read or write, and he had recently be-
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come a father. After asking how he was managing as a father the judge
asked:
JAP: What about the drugs consumption?
Convicted person: I only take cannabis now. I stopped heroin and
alcohol. I’ve reduced my consumption a lot, but I haven’t been able
to stop completely yet.
The man was still under the treatment of health care professionals.
The procureur did not object to the sentence adjustment to unpaid work
and proposed 105 hours together with an obligation to receive health
care treatment, to pay prosecution costs, and with an obligation to work
or receive training (especially with reading and writing).
Cases four and ﬁve were similar hearings but took place in prison and
concerned serving prisoners applying for some form of early release
from prison—either on a day release scheme or by being electronically
tagged. In addition to the JAP, the procureur, and a clerk, a representative
from probation and a duty lawyer were also present.
Case four concerned a young man who had been released under the
semi-liberté regime but was unable to continue for health reasons. He
was ﬁtted with an electronic tag instead. A week later he was returned
to prison. The JAP asked him what happened.
Convicted person: I thought I was going to have the same schedule as
with semi-liberté. . . . I had three beers, three joints and some tablets
as well. [He explains that he had an argument with his stepmother
and she called the police because she was scared, and he has been in
prison since the electronic tagging was suspended a week ago.]
JAP: The probation report sounds as though you are blaming the
JAP for the failure of the electronic tagging.
Convicted person: No, I think it’s my fault. Wearing a tag is not at all
like I thought it would be.
[Probation are asked for their opinion. They think tagging is the best
solution, but as it is now the summer vacation, there will be insufﬁcient
support available for the prisoner to ensure it works this time. They sug-
gest looking at it again in September. The procureur agrees.]
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Convicted person: I would like to take my exam next week.
Lawyer: [speaking for the ﬁrst time] This is a difﬁcult situation. It is
very important that he sits this exam. His father says that he has
worked hard for it. He wrote a letter to his stepmother to apologize.
He needs to study and the prison have refused to let him have
his books in.
[The procureur suggests that he can apply for a day release to take his
exam.]
JAP: Here is my decision: I suspend the electronic tagging. Semi-
liberté is not possible. If you ask for day release to take this exam
I am prepared to allow it. . . . You have got an addiction and you
are not dealing with it properly. Youwill spend the summer in prison
and we will reexamine the situation in September.
Convicted person: Can I get my books in?
JAP: Yes, it seems perfectly legitimate. Probation will speak to the
prison about it.
Case ﬁve concerned a man with a long list of convictions. He received
100 ﬁne days at €10 per day for theft and 30 ﬁne days at €20 for drug use,
both 4 years ago. He has not paid anything and so owes €1,600. He has
been in prison for a year on other offenses and could be released in a few
months.
Procureur: Can you pay now?. . . The judge cannot give you longer
than six months to pay. Can someone lend you the money?
[After a long discussion, the prisoner agrees to pay. The procureur and
the JAP want to be sure that he will be able to pay, and the procureur
makes clear that the consequences will be serious if he does not.
Convicted person: I promise to pay.
JAP: OK I will summon you to appear before me three months
after your release and you will bring the receipts then. If you don’t,
you will be sent back to prison.
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When looking at sentencing policies and practices through a compar-
ative lens, it is important to understand the legal culture and practices
within which they function. These cases are typical and illustrate several
important features of the French process, which are discussed below: the
range of offenses for which sentences are adjusted; the close and coop-
erative working relationship between the procureur and JAP (as part of
the same professional grouping, magistrats) and with probation; the mi-
nor part played by the defense lawyer; the frank and direct communi-
cation between the magistrats and the convicted person; the importance
of the victim’s interests; and the need for convicted persons to demon-
strate that they are making efforts toward their own rehabilitation into
society.
A. Adapting the Sentence to the Offender: The Juge d’Application
des Peines ( JAP)
Alongside other continental European models of criminal justice, the
French legal system is typically portrayed as a top-down hierarchical
process, in which discretion is closely circumscribed. This is reﬂected
in the structures of legal authority designed to ensure the promulgation
of orders and the politique pénale of the executive, through the minister of
justice (for a classic account, see Damaška [1986]). In practice, procureurs
as well as judges enjoy a great deal of discretion (Hodgson 2002, 2005).
It is the procureur who decides whether to charge the suspect, whether
then to pursue a formal prosecution or an alternative such as mediation,
what offense to prosecute, whether to involve the juge d’instruction in
the investigation, how to present the case at trial, and the sentence to
recommend to the court. These decisions are governed in part by legal
constraints, including targets set centrally (see Vigour 2006; Alt and Le
Theule 2011), but they also reﬂect local priorities and the working prac-
tices of individual procureurs.
The scope of discretion is most visible in the treatment of individ-
ual cases. Running alongside, and arguably in tension with, the rhetoric
arounduniformity and hierarchical order, the French criminal justice pro-
cess attaches great weight to the importance of a properly “adapted” crim-
inal response. This approach recognizes that a one-size-ﬁts-all model
of justice may appear to promote equality of treatment but in fact pro-
duces injustice. As one of Hodgson’s procureur respondents explained:
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“Of course there are problems of standardisation . . . you cannot follow
the same politique pénale everywhere because the cases are different, the
populations are different, the problems are different. . . . In one instance
you will prosecute far more offenders than in another, because there is
less delinquency. . . . A uniform system of justice, which is delivered in
the same way everywhere and so which does not take account of differ-
ences, would effectively be a nondemocratic system of justice” (interview
respondent [procureur] A6, quoted in Hodgson [2005, p. 230]).
The impact particular crimes might have on the local community are
important in determining how they should be dealt with:
If you arrest someone with 10g of hashish here [a major city], we will
not prosecute. It is of no interest, it is not a threat to public order.
But in a town of 15,000 inhabitants, where everybody knows one
another, where nothing ever happens, you ﬁnd 10g of hashish and in
fact, you need a different kind of judicial response because everybody is
going to panic, because everybody is going to say, “There are drugs,
we have never had this before, this is a major event” . . . depending
on the scale of the problem, attitudes will be different . . . you can say
that one court was less severe and another court was more severe.
This is because there is a context, and one can say that actually, justice,
from one angle, will not be the same for everyone, but it will be
designed to have the same degree of effectiveness. So effectiveness is
not necessarily achieved by treating all things in the same way. (Inter-
view respondent [ procureur] E5, quoted in Hodgson [2005, p. 230])
This notion of adaptation is also strongly present within the sentencing
process and was one of the chief sources of opposition to the introduc-
tion of peines planchers, which were seen by critics to tie the hands of the
judiciary and to emphasize punitiveness over effectiveness. In the same
way in which prosecution policy is “adapted” to local conditions in order
to be effective, so too there is a keen desire to ensure that the sentence
ﬁts the offender as well as the crime.
Defendants sentenced to imprisonment for a délit at a criminal hear-
ing are not immediately incarcerated, unless the court issues a detention
order. They will later be summoned by the JAP if the decision becomes
deﬁnitive (i.e., no appeal is formed against it within the legal time limit).
Sentences up to 2 years’ imprisonment can be adjusted after conviction
(i.e., a noncustodial sentence can be substituted or the way the prison
sentence is served can be altered). The range of offenses that might be
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dealt with in this way is illustrated by the ﬁve cases outlined above—sex-
ual assault, drug possession, theft. The convicted person works with pro-
bation as well as the JAP to ﬁnd a sentence that will work for her and is
practicable to carry out. For example, electronic tagging requires the
consent of the householder to have equipment installed and the support
of probation to agree on a schedule of movements; carrying out a prison
sentence in semi-liberté requires the offender to have a set schedule that
can be approved in advance.
For their part, the JAP and the procureur speak to offenders about
their life, their family, their work, and their sentence so far, and where
applicable, why they have been returned to prison, to ensure that they
can ﬁnd a solution that will promote the rehabilitation of the individual,
so that she can lead a useful life in society without reoffending. In case
one, prison was delayed in order that the offender could attend a drug
and alcohol rehabilitation program; in case three, the procureur ensured
that literacy and numeracy training were undertaken as well as drug
treatment. Without the ability to read and write, the offender was un-
likely to gain employment. In case four, the JAP ensured that the pris-
oner could study for and then sit his exam, and a second try at electronic
tagging would be considered in a few months. In case ﬁve, both the JAP
and the procureur were prepared to give the offender another chance to
pay at least some of the ﬁnes owed from 4 years ago, sympathizing with
his poverty. In case two, however, the offender had already beneﬁted
from a more individualized sentence, but he had failed to do what was
required and made no effort to provide any guarantee of compliance.
In essence, he had used up his chances.
Armed with information about individuals, their personality, and their
current circumstances, the JAP seeks to assess what will be most effective
in reforming them—in particular, imposing a sentence that is realistic
and can be executed successfully. For their part, offenders are expected
to demonstrate that the proposed sentence is realistic and that they will
stick to what is agreed. Case ﬁve seemed especially generous in this re-
spect. The offender had not been able to pay the ﬁnes for 4 years and
had gotten into more trouble. Payment to victims is taken more seri-
ously than payment of ﬁnes. The production of work schedules, under-
taking treatment programs, and beginning to pay compensation to vic-
tims are all crucial parts of this process. It is clear that no sentence
adjustment is possible without evidence of some, albeit very small, steps
being taken to compensate the victim in accordance with the order of
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the trial court. As the JAP explained to the offender in case two, “I won’t
adjust your sentence without compensation to victims.”
B. The Relationship between Offender and Magistrat
Inmore adversarial systems of criminal justice as in England andWales
and the United States, we are accustomed to judges and prosecutors
remaining at a distance from the accused, all contact being mediated
through the defense lawyer. The direct relationship between themagistrat
and the offender in France is very different. Before trial, the accused
may be brought before the procureur before appearing directly before
the court. During the instruction investigative phase, the juge d’instruction
questions the accused directly. At trial, the judge maintains a constant
dialogue with the accused; the defense lawyer plays a diminished role,
usually consisting of a brief mitigation speech. This direct contact be-
tween judge and offender is also a marked feature of the JAP hearings.
It is unusual for a lawyer to be present, and the hearing is relatively infor-
mal. There is no raised bench, no formal procedures, and no legalistic ter-
minology. Judge, procureur, and offender will discuss the matter together.
There may be reports from the probation service, but the JAP will also
ask the offender directly about home life, the impact of becoming a par-
ent, employment, how drug treatment programs are going, and so on.
They will also ask direct questions about offending and in particular how
the offender is managing drug or alcohol problems.
This direct engagement of the magistrat with the offender is part of a
wider culture in which the criminal justice process (representing the
state) seeks to reform the individual citizen. The judge will try to get
a sense of the offender as an individual and often knows some personal
background about her life in the years preceding her offending. This
approach is not unique to the JAP hearings: an emphasis on the person,
the accused or offender as citizen, is pervasive. Defendants in England
and Wales are essentially “processed” through the courts, objects rather
than subjects of their own trial (Hodgson 2006); likewise in the United
States (Bogira 2006). Although French defendants might also feel that
they are processed through the courts as they struggle to understand
the process,4 they are addressed directly, required to account for them-
selves and to respond to the accusations against them. In contrast to an
4 See the Ministry of Justice ( January 2014) survey at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art
_pix/j21-p-jpj.pdf.
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adversarial procedure, their character is before the court from the outset
(before any ﬁnding of guilt) and is seen as an essential part of evaluating
the evidence (Field 2006).
The role of the procureur in these hearings is also important. As a
magistrat (along with the JAP, the juge d’instruction, and trial judges),
the procureur’s function is deﬁned in different terms from that of an ad-
versarial public prosecutor; in particular, her professional ideology re-
quires her to represent the public interest. Procureurs work with other
agencies in the development of local crime policies and intervene in
noncriminal cases in which actions threaten the public interest. For ex-
ample, the procureurmay attend hearings at the commercial court to de-
fend the “economic public order,” which may include the protection of
jobs in a company takeover. She is also seen to represent the interests of
the victim—typically by insisting that some attempt is made at paying
compensation to the victim—as well as the wider public interest. How-
ever, the way in which the public interest is understood within the neu-
tral terms of the professional ideology of the magistrat is not always re-
ﬂected in the practice of the public prosecutor. Hodgson (2005) has
argued that the predominant crime control ideology of procureurs is of-
ten clothed in the legitimacy of public interest. Acting in the public in-
terest, or seeking the truth in an investigation, is, in practice, often syn-
onymous with obtaining an admission.
However, the procureur’s role in representing the public interest dur-
ing the postconviction sentencing process seems to be a little different.
In the examples observed, it was not rooted in a crime control ideology
as is so often seen in the trial and pretrial role, but seemed to be closer to
the more neutral rhetoric of the magistrat. Rather than seeking a puni-
tive response, the procureur worked in a spirit of cooperation to see what
could be agreed to (delaying prison to accommodate a rehabilitation
program; substituting prison for electronic tagging or unpaid work; hav-
ing a day release from prison to sit an exam), while ensuring that the
sentence is credible (“you cannot come back to the prison in the eve-
ning completely drunk”) and the victim’s interests in receiving com-
pensation are respected. Interestingly, observations of the CRPC meet-
ings between the procureur, the accused, and the defense lawyer were
similarly cooperative and nonconﬂictual.
Offenders appear to be comfortable with this direct relationship, and
they are often frank in their conversations with magistrats telling them
how they feel, what they struggle with and not trying to disguise, for ex-
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ample, continued unlawful behavior. Noticeably absent in the sentenc-
ing process is the defense lawyer, other than a duty lawyer in prison
hearings, for those who want one. Again, this reﬂects the relatively di-
minished role of the defense lawyer throughout the criminal process,
comparedwith her institutionalized functionwithinmore adversarial pro-
cedures. In the French court, typically, several cases are heard together,
and then after a short adjournment, the verdicts and sentences are all an-
nounced together. The defense lawyer will normally have left the court
and so will not be present for the verdict or the sentence (this does not
hold true of cases involving serious crimes tried in the cour d’assises).
Lawyers tend also not to be present during the JAP hearings, as they do
not have a formal role in the procedure. There is a higher degree of trust
inmagistrats as representatives of the public interest (rather than punitive,
crime control–oriented prosecutors, e.g.), as well as a culture of direct
engagement between judge and accused or offender, as noted above. This
contrasts sharply with more adversarial procedures, where the defense
lawyer would seek to shield the accused from direct questioning that
might risk incriminating admissions.
As well as being direct, judges and procureurs speak to accused and
convicted persons in often quite moralizing tones. At one level, this may
be objectionable because it is patronizing, but there is also a potentially
positive strand to this approach. In England and Wales and the United
States, by contrast, there is almost no contact between the prosecutor
or judge and the accused. Defendants are objects to be processed through
the system by the criminal justice repeat players—the prosecutors, de-
fense lawyers, magistrates—who speak for, about, and at the accused.
There are few moralizing speeches about the need to break out of a cycle
of drug use and criminality or the potential thatmight be realized in a per-
son. Defendants are seen as undeserving of this and unlikely to beneﬁt.
In short, their value as useful members of society is implicitly denied. In
France, this process of “othering” is much less pronounced. Only in
the Youth Court in England andWales are defendants addressed as they
are in France: asking them why they would commit an offense and risk
their liberty or what the welfare of their family is; encouraging them to
take up offers of training and make something of their life. The discourse
of magistrats focuses on the reintegration into society of the offender as
citizen. In admonishing the accused or the convicted person, in delivering
moralizing lectures, the magistrat is afﬁrming the potential of rehabilita-
tion and the value of the individual.
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C. Too Much Discretion, Not Enough Public Accountability?
Theoretical accounts of the inquisitorial model of procedure have
characterized it by its hierarchical structures of authority and the ab-
sence of individual discretion. Contemporary French criminal justice,
however, is characterized by both hierarchy and discretion; the two
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is a question of degree. The discre-
tion of the procureur is framed by the wider criminal justice policy pro-
mulgated from the minister of justice through the prosecution hierar-
chy, but in practice, this places little constraint on the actions of the
procureur. Policies are expressed in broad terms, and there is little or
no policing of their implementation at the local level. Centrally deter-
mined targets around methods of case disposition, together with local
interagency cooperation, provide some framing, but procureurs enjoy
considerable latitude in their interpretation of the public interest in in-
dividual cases. Hodgson’s (2005) empirical study of procureurs, for ex-
ample, demonstrated the ease with which the repressive crime control
practices of the procureur were ﬁtted into a more neutral discourse of
public interest.
Critics of the JAP process of individualization in sentencing tend not
to question magistrats’ commitment to their professional ideology and
values, but object to the existence of broad discretion per se. It is perhaps
unrealistic to separate out these two; a judge who exercises discretion in
an excessive or arbitrary way is not acting in accordance with the public
interest professional ideology. Pradel is one such critic, arguing that with
judicial discretion comes the risk of excessive discretion and so arbitrar-
iness and inequality (Pradel 2007). Policies such as minimum sentences
avoid this. In contrast to countries such as England and Wales, where
the judiciary might be seen as preventing the excesses of the executive
by holding its members accountable under the rule of law, in France,
the state-centered nature of French political culture is such that judges
are mistrusted by government, and it is the democratically elected exec-
utive that claims to hold the unelected judiciary to account. One might
compare the JAP to the juge d’instruction: operating within a legal frame-
work and with the procureur participating in the entire process, the JAP
exercises a broad discretion according to what she considers to be ap-
propriate in the individual case. And like the juge d’instruction, the pro-
cess takes place behind closed doors and without reasons. This lack of
transparency requires a great deal of trust in the magistrat. This is char-
acteristic of the entire French criminal justice process: Mouhanna (2001,
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p. 82) describes trust as a pragmatic response to the irreconcilable de-
mands of justice. It also risks the JAP replacing the trial judge as sen-
tencer and so moves the truth of sentencing out of court and into the
judge’s chambers.
The new ability of the court to adjourn sentencing in order to gather
up information on the offender represents a different way of doing sen-
tencing. Rather than considering such information in private after trial
and sentence have been concluded in court, it allows for relevant infor-
mation to be brought before the trial judge and taken into account at the
time the sentence is passed in court. It might be argued that this is more
efﬁcient, as well as bringing the truth of sentencing back into the court-
room. Saas (2010) questions whether this will have an impact on judicial
behavior, given judges’ reluctance to take advantage of the more recent
diversiﬁcation of sentences that are available to them. The Consensus
Commission also noted the continued preference for ﬁnes and impris-
onment; the diversiﬁcation of trial procedures has not been matched by
a diversiﬁcation of sanctions. The role of the procureur is key here, as
the sentence she recommends is invariably followed by the trial court—
in type if not in severity. However, in contrast to the JAP, the procureur
has little information on the person’s background, and this may be a bar-
rier to the proposal of alternative sanctions to the court.
IV. Looking Ahead
It is difﬁcult to predict what the future holds for sentencing reform in
France. The ministry of justice has recently turned its attention to yet
another reform of the juvenile justice system. The French juvenile jus-
tice system is regulated by the Ordonnance of 2 February 1945, which
has been amended no fewer than 36 times.During the 2012 election cam-
paign, President Hollande had promised the abolition of the tribunaux
correctionnels pour mineurs composed of three professional judges and in-
stituted by the Act of 11 August 2011 to try repeat offenders aged be-
tween 16 and 18 years old risking a prison sentence of 3 years or over.
Prior to the 2011 reform, these defendants were tried along with other
juvenile defendants by a tribunal pour enfants (youth court) composed
of a professional judge and two lay judges with professional experience
of juvenile questions. The 2011 act was criticized by professionals as go-
ing against the spirit of the 1945 ordonnance, which favors an educative
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over a repressive approach. However, LeMonde reported in January 2015
that the new courts had tried only 787 young defendants between January
2012 and November 2013 and had not imposed more severe sentences
( Johannès 2015). It is therefore unlikely that their abolition will have
much more than a symbolic effect. Nevertheless, it has been reported
that the government was hesitant to propose the reform because of the
proximity of regional elections in 2016, followed by presidential elections
in 2017 ( Johannès 2015).
The question of radicalization in French prisons has been at the fore-
front of public debates following the attacks in Paris in January 2015.
A recent parliamentary report pointed out that recent terrorist attacks
in Paris and Toulouse were all committed by former prisoners. Yet it
also admitted that it was established that their radicalization did not
take place in prison and that a minority of people traveling to Iraq or
Syria to join extremist groups had spent time in prison beforehand.
Khosrokhavar (2013) identiﬁed the main cause of radicalization in prison
as the existence of deep frustrations, in particular, the near impossibil-
ity of performing religious duties for Muslim inmates. This combines
with overcrowding, understafﬁng, and high turnover of both staff and
prisoners. Keen to be seen to act against radicalization in French pris-
ons, the ministry of justice announced the recruitment of 60 Muslim
ministers in January 2015. Furthermore, a provision of the intelligence
bill currently being discussed in Parliament gives greater powers and re-
sources to prison administrators to monitor electronic communications
and prisoners’ interactions. This has been opposed by the minister of
justice, who argues that, as the guarantor of individual freedom, the jus-
tice system cannot be seen to be the prescriber of phone tapping and
microphones’ installation in prison cells. It was further claimed that such
a move would undermine the necessary trust between guards and in-
mates (Suc 2015).
The return of Nicolas Sarkozy to the political stage as president of
the main opposition party could spell a remake of the 2012 presidential
election if François Hollande also seeks a second mandate in 2017.
Whether the Left will remain committed to broadly rehabilitative ideals
remains to be seen. Some in the Socialist Party, such asManuel Valls, who
was promoted to the position of prime minister in March 2014, would
like to see the adoption of a tougher line, in response to the accusations
of naïve leniency traditionally levied against left-wing parties. In view of
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the rise of the extreme-right party—the Front National—in the polls, a
surge in penal populism cannot be ruled out, with bothmainstream parties
attempting to outbid the other through tough-on-crime manifestos.
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